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BUPFALO LAW RRVIEW
these services were received by decedent; as to that item completed after his
death, the Court found a valid basis in the fact context for an implied contract
between appellant and the benefited representatives of the decedent.
Each case of this nature must be decided on its own merits and no single
factor is necessarily determinative. Rather, the entire pattern must be evaluated
to discover whether the weight of the evidence justifies a finding that the relation-
ship of attorney-client existed.
Joint Savings Accounts
When a deposit in the specified form is made in a joint savings bank
account, a conclusive presumption arises upon the decease of one of the parties
thereto that the intention was to vest title in the survivor, absent a showing of
fraud or undue influence.2 5 As a matter of substantive law, mere compliance with
the statutory requirements makes the evidence of intent irrefutable20 and no
burden of proof falls upon the survivor to substantiate it,27 nor is any proof of
actual intent material.28 Despite this dear language, there remains an issue as to
the actual volition of the person in signing the joint deposit form-i.e., when
the act of making the deposit itself was voluntary, there is a conclusive presump-
tion of intent to vest the monies in the survivor but where the act of depositing
originally was not knowingly, consciously and freely made, the entire transaction
may be seen as a nullity and no presumption may follow. The effect of involuntary
transfers therefore may be distinguished from the results which flow from a volun-
tary establishment of a joint account.20
This critical distinction formed the basis for the majority opinion in In re
Creekrnore's Estate.30 The decedent while in her final illness had expressed a desire
to execute powers-of-attorney to her daughter to enable the daughter to utilize
four bank accounts for the payment of bills. This desire was communicated to
her attorney who contacted the banks. One of the banks was willing to accept
a power-of-attorney but two others recommended the creation of joint accounts.
The attorney took the proferred forms to the decedent and, after a ten-minute
private conference, the decedent executed all the forms. The daughter claimed the
proceeds of the latter two accounts which represented three-fifths of the decedent's
assets. A beneficiary of these accounts under decedent's will contested.
25. N. Y. BANKING LAW §239-3.
26. In re Porian-da's Estate, 256 N. Y. 423, 176 N. E. 826 (1931); Walsh v.
Keenan, 293 N. Y. 573, 59 N. E. 2d 409 (1944).
27. In re Feneloe's Estate, 262 N. Y. 308, 186 N. E. 794 (1933).
28. Inda v. Inda, 288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. 2d 59 (1942).
29. In re Buchanan's Estate, 184 App, Div. 237, 171 N. Y. Supp. 708 (3d Dep't
1918); In re Fenelon's Estate, 262 N. Y. 57, 186 N. E. 201 (1933).
30. 1 N. Y. 2d 284, 135 N. E. 2d 193 (1956).
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The Surrogate held in favor of the beneficiary on the basis that the daughter
had not shown a knowing and conscious creation and sanction of the accounts by
decedent.3 ' On appeal, this finding of facts was affirmed but the holding was
reversed strictly on the grounds of the conclusive evidence of the execution in
the proper form.
3 2
In reinstating the Surrogate's holding, the Court first acknowledged the
presumption created by Section 239-3 where the executed intention to make the
requisite deposit was present. But, it then indicated that the signature itself was
merely evidence of the intent to make the deposit in this form, subject to the
usual burden on the proponent to establish the competency of the decedent where,
in the Court's opinion, the circumstances are such that additional proof is necessary
to supplement the fact of formal execution.33 These circumstances here included
the drastic change which would be effected in decedents testamentary plan, the
request for mere powers-of-attorney, the general weakened condition of decedent
and the natural confidence which she had in both her attorney and her banks.
The failure of the daughter to carry the burden of proof as to the knowing and
conscious execution as established in the lower courts therefore demanded a
holding for the beneficiary.
In a powerful opinion, the dissent noted that there had been no evidence of
incompetency, fraud or undue influence presented and that no inference of inca-
pacity could be inferred from the fact that decedent was old and ailing.34 The
language used in setting forth the presumption as a substantive rule of law in
Section 239-3 was clear and unambiguous and was intended to provide a rule of
certainty for both banks and depositors.35 It therefore deserved a strict interpre-
tation of the type it had received in earlier cases.36 There was no need to show
the actual intent in executing but only its accomplishment, and evidence as to any
other factors was immaterial. The Yauch3 7 case which greatly aided the majority
in reaching its opinion was decided on a lack of proper formal execution and
therefore was not in point here.
In evaluating the merits of the two divergent opinions, the search for
certainty, in banking routine which led to the enactment of Section 239-3 must
be given great weight as a legislative judgment for the general public good.3 8
31. - Misc. - , 139 N. Y. S. 2d 434 (SUrr. Ct. 1954).
32. 286 App. Div. 857, 141 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (2d Dep't 1955).
33. In re Reilly's Will, 139 Misc. 732, 249 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Surr. Ct. 1931);
lin re Mullin's Will, 143 Misc. 256, 256 N. Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
34. Horn v. Pullman, 72 N. Y. 269 (1878); In re Wolf's Will, 196 App. Div.
722, 188 N. Y. Supp. 438 (4th Dep't 1921).
35. Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929).
36. See note 28, supra.
37. In re Yauch's Will, 296 N. Y. 585, 68 N. E. 2d 875 (1946).
38. MeGuire v. Auburn Say. Bankc, 78 App. Div. 22, 79 N. Y. Supp, 91 (4th
Dep't 1902); Giffor4 v. Oneida Sav. Bank, 99 App. Div. 25, 90 N. Y. Supp. 693 (3d
Dep't 1904); Back v. Bowery Say. Bank, 162 Misc. 403, 294 N. Y. Supp. 818 (Mun.
Ct. 1937).
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To require a showing of knowing and conscious execution as required in will
contests would seem to defeat the policy rationale and place banking institutions
in a position of not knowing to whom funds in a joint account are payable.
While, as the dissent indicates, the application of Section 239-3 in the exceptional
case may cause an inequitable result, this is essentially a legislative question,
not a judicial one.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Survival of Right to Alimony
Section 1170-b of the New York Civil Practice Act,1 which allows a wife
to bring an action for support and maintenance after an ex parte divorce decree
has been obtained against her, was construed for the first time by the Court of
Appeals in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.2 In the face of a vigorous dissent, the Court
held, affirming the Appellate Division,3 that the application of section 1170-b to
a situation of this sort was not a denal of full faith and credit to the foreign
judgment.4
Williams v. North Carolina5 has made it incumbent upon a state to give
recognition to foreign ex parte divorce decrees where one of the parties has
become a domiciliary in that foreign jurisdiction. Whether or not an ex parte
decree which purports to deny alimony' to the party not personally served is
entitled to full faith and credit depends upon the nature of the right to support
which the wife enjoys. If this right to support is completely and inseparably
annejed to the marital status in the sense that it is destroyed upon dissolution of
the status, then a valid divorce decree, even though ex parte, would be a bar to
1. N. Y. Civ. PpIAc. AcT §1170-b. In an action for divorce, separation or
annulment, or for a declaration of nullity of a void marriage, where the court
refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the court that a divorce,
annulment or judgment declaring the marriage a nullity had previously been
granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the
wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the same action
such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife ...
2. 1 N. Y. 2d 342, 135 N. E. 2d 553 (1956), cert. granted, 352 U. S. 820 (1956).
3. 1 A. D. 2d 3, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 125 (1st Dep't 1955).
4. U. S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
5. 317 U. S. 287 (1942). The plaintiff in the instant case also attacked the
jurisdiction of Nevada over the marriage status. on the grounds that defendant
had not satisfied domiciliary requirements; judgment was against her upon this
issue. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
6. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 179 P. 638 (1919). Nevada does not
have a statute preserving the right to support. Decisional law In Nevada has
been to the effect that a divorce decree which does not grant alimony and does
not leave the question open thereby denies it.
